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Since the ceasefire in 1994, the intractable conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh continues to have a 
severe impact on security and development in the Caucasus region. Internally displaced 
Azerbaijanis (IDPs) from Nagorno-Karabakh are one of the main stakeholders in the conflict, and 
yet little study has addressed the impact of their symbolic values and identity issues vis-à-vis 
resolution efforts. Accordingly, this thesis focuses on four themes which arose in the author’s 
ethnographic research in Azerbaijan with internally displaced Azerbaijanis. The paper will address 
the group’s relation to the land, the framing of kinship and identity, relations with Armenia and 
the Armenian community, and perspectives on youth and trauma. Looking at the significance of 
informal histories and collective memory for this community, the thesis intends to add to a growing 
repository of qualitative study in intractable conflicts, and considers how identity issues can play 














            The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict began in 1988, when growing movements for national 
sovereignty within the Soviet Union sparked ethnic tensions between Azerbaijan and Armenia. 
The semi-autonomous oblast of Nagorno-Karabakh was placed under the administration of 
Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic in 1923 in order to quash conflict in the region and expand 
the control of the Soviet Union under Stalin. This allocation of Nagorno-Karabakh resulted in 
many decades of relative peace in the region throughout the 20th century (Gahramanova, 2010). 
However, the population underwent gradual but extreme demographic changes, and by the late 
1980s, Nagorno-Karabakh was composed of approximately a 74% ethnic Armenian and 25% 
Azeri population (Najafizadeh, 162, 2013). As perestroika gave way to the first expressions of 
nationalism, ethnic Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh petitioned for the territory to be unified with 
the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic. Drawing upon historic claims and grievances in regard to 
the Soviet Union’s territorial engineering, the petitions went into full force in 1987. Neither the 
Azerbaijani state nor the Soviet Union was prepared to acknowledge these calls for administration 
changes and the mass demonstrations in Stepanakert and Yerevan which followed in 1988. Once 
Armenian and Azerbaijani nationalisms were backed up by real communal violence, with both 
states claiming historical rights of ownership over Nagorno-Karabakh, inability to evade the 
burgeoning conflict or resolve it peacefully led to a full-fledged war over the territory by 1991 
(Najafizadeh, 2013). As the Soviet Union collapsed and withdrew its troops from the region, the 
unprecedented flow of weaponry and mercenaries to both sides plunged the newly-independent 
states into brutal chaos (Human Rights Watch, 1994). By 1993, Nagorno-Karabakh and seven 
adjacent Azerbaijani districts were under Armenian control (De Waal, 2003).  
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Although the fighting ended ostensibly in 1994 with a Russian-brokered ceasefire 
agreement, Nagorno-Karabakh and the seven surrounding districts, which comprise approximately 
16% of Azerbaijan’s pre-war territory, continue to be occupied by the Republic of Armenia and 
operate as a de facto state (Garagozov, 2016). During 1991-1994, estimates of between 750,000 
to a million ethnic Azerbaijanis were expelled from their lands in and around Nagorno-Karabakh 
and Armenia (Najafizadeh, 2013; de Waal, 2008; UNHCR, 2009). In a small country with little 
more than 8.5 million citizens, roughly one in eight people retain status as either refugees or 
internally displaced people (IDPs) (UNHCR, 2009). Nagorno-Karabakh is still the site of border 
skirmishes and cease-fire violations (Kopecek et al, 2016).1 Over the years, there have been 
significant and ongoing intergovernmental efforts to resolve the territorial dispute peacefully, as 
heads of state work with international mediators via the OSCE Minsk Group, but these efforts have 
not been able to implement a lasting compromise which would satisfy the conflict’s stakeholders 
(Geukjian, 2016). The two countries, former neighbors and even kin, remain bitterly cut off from 
each other, and communication between the communities is highly polarized. Nagorno-Karabakh 
and the IDP situation remain the central social and security issue for Azerbaijan, and indeed for 
the Caucasus region and beyond (Kopecek et al, 2016). 
This thesis will take a qualitative analysis approach which will focus on personal stories of 
displaced people from Nagorno-Karabakh to understand cultural trauma and perceptions of politics 
as a factor in the conflict. During the nine months I spent studying and working in the capital Baku, 
I made close personal ties with many people in the Nagorno-Karabakh IDP community. I first 
                                                          
1 In 2016, Azerbaijan went on the offensive. The three days of fighting on the border, known as the April War, 
resulted in an estimated 350 causalities. It was the largest border skirmish since the 1994 ceasefire was 
implemented, demonstrating that the frozen conflict could turn hot any time (Jarosiewicz & Folkowski, 2016). 
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went under the auspices of the Critical Language Scholarship for Turkish in 2016, and having been 
inspired by the curious conjunction of Turkic and Soviet culture, returned in 2018 for continued 
study in Azerbaijani and Turkish.  Listening to the stories of my host family and my language 
instructors, who were, incidentally, all from Nagorno-Karabakh, and gaining a deeper 
understanding of the situation through work with the Ministry of Education’s IDP language 
program gave me inspiration for this thesis. While IDPs/refugees in Azerbaijan have benefited 
from state-led as well as international aid programs to address shortages in housing, education, 
employment and basic subsistence, twenty-six years later, this population remains underserved 
and economically disadvantaged (Najafizadeh, 2013; Refugee and IDP Committee of Azerbaijan, 
2019; UNHCR, 2009). This project intends to contribute to a deeper understanding of this 
community’s needs, grievances, and perspectives, and thus add to the growing literature on the 
impact of identity issues within the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.  
 
Fieldwork Methodology 
After receiving IRB approval from Portland State’s Human Research Committee, I traveled 
to Baku to conduct semi-structured in-person interviews with IDPs in order to learn how they relate 
to their historical memories of displacement and how their grievances are addressed or not 
addressed by existing governance strategies. I employed ethnographic interviewing and participant 
observation as my primary method of data collection, in conjunction with secondary sources. 
Qualitative methodologies have been shown to be an effective way of documenting and preserving 
history and perspectives, and engaging with cultural issues and values (Bernard et al, 2015; 
Seidman, 1998).  In the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, there has been very little qualitative work from 
researchers outside of the conflict (Gamaghelyan, 2010). While I am not a stakeholder in this 
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conflict, I am an American researcher who is personally involved in this community and am 
cognizant of being limited in only representing the Azerbaijani side. With this in mind, I have 
attempted to preserve the agency and voice of the Azerbaijani IDPs who participated in this study, 
with the belief that the stories of ordinary people, in their own words, are a critical addition to 
existing literature on Nagorno-Karabakh and on historical displacement. In intractable conflict, 
collective narratives of the war are typically conformist to the nationalist narratives (Ginges & 
Atran, 2011). From my early observations and work of others, such as Garagozov (2016, 2012), 
the personal experiences of IDPs do not always conform to the social norms reproduced by the 
state. Thus, the stories of IDPs may serve as an important area to consider the intersection of 
collective and individual constructions of history and imaginings for the future that must be taken 
into account for resolution and reconciliation.  
The fundamental criterion of the study was to interview people from Nagorno-Karabakh 
or one of the 7 neighboring occupied territories who could share first-hand memories of their 
homes and the war.  I interviewed ten people of varying socio-economic levels, six women and 
four men, between the ages of 37-68 from six regions. All but one had fled during the war and 
therefore had official IDP status2. Interviewees were comprised both of those I knew personally 
and those referred by existing contacts through snowball sampling. In Azerbaijan, people are more 
inclined to engage in projects if they are personally referred by someone they know and trust (via 
kinship or strong community networks), which is why snowball sampling was determined to be 
                                                          
2 İn Azerbaijani məcburi qöçkün means forced migrant or internally displaced person (IDP), in contrast to qaçkın, 
which means refugee and refers to ethnic Azeris who lived inside Armenia, although at times these terms are used 
interchangeably.  
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the most effective form of recruitment. In coming into such a tight-knit community as a foreigner, 
and asking people to speak on emotional and sensitive issues, these personal introductions were 
absolutely crucial to establishing trust. The open-ended interviews were conducted in Azerbaijani, 
lasting 45 minutes to two hours in length, and held in classrooms and sitting rooms, both one-on-
one and jointly. Before proceeding with the interviews, participants were briefed on the intention 
of the study: to provide their personal experiences of being from Nagorno-Karabakh and their 
perspectives to contribute to research on the issue. Interviews were conducted after receiving 
informed consent, and the identities of the participants were protected with pseudonyms.3  
Interview questions, while open-ended, were based on a framework to address key areas 
of interest created with my thesis advisor Harry Anastasiou. The questions were organized in two 
groups and further broken down into past, present, and future: 
1.     Nagorno-Karabakh IDPs’ personal experiences: 
(personal history relating to the community and interactions with the other)  
in the Past (before the conflict, during the conflict, during displacement) 
in the Present (currently, in Baku) 
in the Future (whether they perceive/wish/expect the situation will change or not) 
2.     Nagorno-Karabakh IDPs’ perceptions of political leadership and government: 
(relating to their concerns, grievances, and aspirations) 
in the Past (before the conflict, as the conflict started, during displacement) 
in the Present (the current state of affairs, locally and internationally) 
                                                          
3 Despite assurances that I would be the only one accessing the recordings of the interviews, several participants 
were not comfortable having their responses recorded, or frequently asked me to turn off the recorder, so I relied on 
notes and write-ups of some exchanges. 
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in the Future (visions for the future) 
The transcriptions of the interviews made up the basis of the primary-source material, but were 
accompanied by participant observations gathered from spending time with respondents; from 
drinking tea in their homes, looking at photo albums and maps, to conversations with taxi drivers, 
peers, and visits to schools and war memorials. The interviews themselves were couched in much 
longer conversations, including discussions with the whole family—grandparents and children 
alike. In fact, in all the interviews which took place in people’s homes, other family members were 
present at one time or another. The family dynamic was and is a primary part of life in Azerbaijan 
and critical to understanding the multilevel issue of Nagorno-Karabakh. This dynamic was not 
something I could capture fully with a recorder, both for ethical and practical reasons, but it is the 
crucial and invisible backdrop of this research.  
Following an inductive or grounded approach to data analysis and interpretation, as 
outlined by Seidman (1998) and Bernard (2015), I coded the transcripts by the themes and sub-
themes which emerged as core issues in the interviews and in my observations. These were issues 
I found emphasized in individual stories, and across interviews and informal exchanges. The 
process allowed me to code excerpts by multiple themes, in order to examine them by group and 
consider them in terms of my secondary sources. What follows is the interpretation of themes 
which were found to be salient in the stories of Nagorno-Karabakh IDPs. These themes have been 
conditionally addressed in four sections: relations to the land; kinship and identity; relations with 
Armenia; and youth and trauma. While a study of this proportion is highly limited, attention to 
these issues can shed light on the ongoing grievances of this population and other historically 
displaced peoples. It can invite greater reflection when it comes to the future for this community 
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and help explain why the conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh remains frozen despite decades of 
attempts at resolution. 
 
Limitations 
As my first experience of ethnographic interviewing in a non-native language, I quickly 
realized that my page of meticulously translated interview questions was a guide and not a rule. I 
had to learn to adjust my framing of the questions for each participant, to bring up subjects in a 
way that was natural and not forced, while still addressing my fundamental questions: how and in 
what context did this person grow up, how did they experience the war, how did they perceive the 
Armenian community, the political leaders, the present situation and the future. Leading these 
conversations, I also realized that I had the responsibility to gauge the emotional direction of the 
interview. I would begin by asking participants to tell me about how they grew up, what their 
community was like, etc. But, inevitably, as the conversation turned to conditions of displacement 
and war, painful memories and experiences would come up. While secondary sources allow one 
to develop an understanding of operant issues and concepts, the challenge of this qualitative study 
was to faithfully convey the significance of these interviews, which come from real people 
struggling and hoping for a better future. Fully representing the emotional dimension of these 
interviews and interactions was a clear limitation in such a short paper. Revisiting traumatic events 
and taking the time to explain their lives was not without risk for interviewees, and these 
interactions influenced how I came to understand the conflict.  
When I returned to the US, I listened to the recordings in Azerbaijani and transcribed them 
in English. It was an extremely tedious process, which forced me to spend hours on a single 
interview, thanks to the dearth of online Azerbaijani language resources and my ignorance of 
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Russian military vocabulary. More importantly, going through the recordings word-by-word, I was 
truly struck by the emotional weight of people’s stories, in a way that I had not been during the 
interviews. Translating recounts of torture and tragedy was as intellectually draining as it was 
emotionally. I have worked to bridge the gap between the objectivity of academic writing and the 
language of my informants, but I invite the reader to imagine that they are sitting down, drinking 
tea and listening to these stories as I did.  
 
Land 
The kids ask me, if you could would you return to Agdam? And I say, do you 
understand what love for the land is? I would return today. If we got it back I would 
return today. Immediately, to my city. Today if I went back to Agdam I would still 
know the place of everything, what was where, even though it has been completely 
destroyed now. 
(Xatira, personal interview, January 15, 2019) 
Torpaq is one of the central keywords in the Karabakh issue. In Azerbaijani it means land, 
earth, the ground itself. The issue of Karabakh is centered around the meaning of that particular 
land and the values that are ascribed to it by its stakeholders, both concretely and symbolically 
(Gagarozov, 2016). From the stand-point of international politics, Nagorno-Karabakh is an ethno-
territorial conflict. The conflict is discussed in terms of its strategic location, the demographics of 
its people, and the natural resources available to be exploited by competing states. Attempts at 
resolution have focused on interest-based solutions with assessments based on how much arable 
land, lumber, mineral resources, political space and so forth can be traded in negotiations between 
heads of state (Gamaghelyan, 2010).  However, looking at conflict in terms of resources is highly 
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insufficient when it comes to understanding how people from Karabakh and greater Azerbaijan 
ascribe symbolic value to the land and thus why this conflict persists (Newman, 2006). 
Dede baba yurdu is the colloquial Azerbaijani term for homeland. Literally, the home of 
one’s grandfathers. 4  In rural culture, where people’s spiritual and material livelihoods are 
intimately connected to the earth, the community is dependent on the land for its survival and 
wealth. The land, therefore, had meaning in itself: as Newman (2006) discussed, the concrete 
political and economic significance of territory is ultimately secondary to “feelings of belonging 
and rootedness” (p. 97). In rural Nagorno-Karabakh, communities were in direct relationships with 
the springs, the forests, the mountains, the meadows, the animals, and holy places (Watts, 2013). 
These physical elements, combined with the region’s long and colorful history as the birthplace of 
many of Azerbaijan’s greatest poets, musicians, and scientists, became part of the mythology and 
symbolism which make Karabakh not only special, but central to the identities of people and their 
families who were displaced (Najafizadeh, 2015). Nagorno-Karabakh is considered to be the 
repository for Azerbaijan’s history and legacy.5 Claiming right to the land is substantiated by a 
primordial narrative of belongingness (“home of the grandfathers”) which is reproduced as much 
on the community-story level (through oral histories of kinship and folk heroes) as through the 
state-centric reproduction (Geukjian, 2016). As Armenia and Azerbaijan continue in competition 
for the territory, their stances are rooted in contending and incompatible claims to this ancestral 
                                                          
4 Vatan is the political term for nation or homeland. For instance, Azerbaijan is considered IDP’s vatan, but 
Karabakh is considered IDP’s dede-baba yurdu. 
5 See Virtual Karabakh, 2018. 
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homeland, with each state engaged in reproductions of narratives which substantiate their own 
mythologies and invalidate the other’s (Newman, 2006; Gahramanova, 2010; Gamaghelyan, 2010).  
The love of the land arose as a central theme in interviews and informal discussions, 
reflecting a common long-term sentiment in intractable conflict (Halperin & Pliskin, 2015). 
Sentiments, in contrast to short-term emotions, are enduring compositions of emotion toward a 
group, place, or symbol (Halperin & Pliskin, 2015). Love for the land supports and validates other 
enduring sentiments in this conflict, such as entrenched feelings of hatred toward the Armenian 
community and a sense of victimization due to the loss of land and livelihood. In Nagorno-
Karabakh, in both rural and urban areas, people lived well before the war: IDPs spoke with great 
pride about their abundant gardens and the homes they had built, their livestock and local jobs, the 
beauty of nature and friendly interethnic relations.  To lose the physical land—along with their 
savings, homes, and worldly possessions in the blink of an eye, was a trauma that remains alive in 
their hearts and their memories. As common in long-term conflict situations, these personal stories 
have been passed down to the younger generations and crystallized in the oral history of their 
families and communities (Atran and Axelrod, 2008; Gamaghelyan, 2010).  One man from Qubatli 
spoke about this feeling for Karabakh:  
There was not a place we didn’t love. Everywhere was beautiful. Beautiful 
mountains, beautiful gardens, beautiful springs, beautiful views, lakes, meadows, 
forests. The forests of Shusha, the historic forests of Shusha. The plane forests… 
We would collect strawberries, mushrooms, plants that had been discovered long 
long ago by our forefathers. Since the day we opened our eyes we were nourished 
by these foods. I sat beside the springs, I swam in the rivers and in the lakes, I 
wandered in the rocks. 
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(Elshad, personal interview, January 21, 2019) 
The value of Karabakh is about identity as much as it about resources: not only the violent 
occupation of territory, the loss of livelihood and home for nearly a million people, but being 
ripped from the places that they held dear and depended on for sustenance. Taking care of the land 
is perceived as a part of a community’s responsibility (Watts, 2013). Because of this symbolic 
valuation of the land and how it falls under traditional codes of honor, the land becomes an 
extension of identity for residents there (Atran & Axelrod, 2008). In the context of ongoing conflict, 
the occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh is mythologized by Azerbaijanis as a spiritual as well as 
physical destruction of their identity by the Armenian and Russian (imperial) forces. To illustrate 
this symbolic desecration, multiple interviewees mentioned the sorrow of leaving behind the 
graves of parents, the cutting of forests in Shusha and Zengilan, and the changing of historical 
names and razing of monuments,6 to show that the cruelty of the other group went beyond the 
simple destruction of war and targeted sites that the Azerbaijani communities considered sacred. 
For IDPs, these examples carried as much significance as the loss of material goods and 
possessions. Such examples add a symbolic dimension to the community’s grievances. These 
stories serve as the superstructure to collective sentiment, in accordance with Halperin’s (2016) 
assessment that, “the emotional sentiments, or emotional ‘stories’ serve as a glue, holding together 
the conflict-supporting beliefs contained in the collective memory” (p. 134).  
                                                          
6 See Muth (2014) for a study on the erasure of Azerbaijani language in Stepanakert.  
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Stories of love for the land were intertwined with other negative sentiments. A woman 
from Zengilan expressed a sense of outrage and victimization shared by IDPs, while also implying 
that the new generation has a duty to right the wrongs passed down to them:  
This land was from our grandfathers. How can you take ownership of that land? 
You cannot. Because look, how many talented people grew up there, how many 
historical monuments. They have destroyed all of them, not a single one remains, 
not one. We will never be able to forgive them. I don’t believe that the generation 
that comes after us will forgive them. I don’t believe it at all.  
(Nergiz, personal interview, January 18, 2019)  
The love of the land and the memories of home give IDPs hope for the future, but are also 
the source of their collective grief. This longing for the past, coupled with decades of living in a 
state of limbo, has entrenched strong feelings of injustice and hatred. These sentiments inspire 
many IDPs and regular citizens (non-IDPs) to advocate for revenge and violence as a solution to 
their grievances, when “the peaceful road” seems to have produced only dead-ends (Geukjian, 
2010). As studies by Garagozov (2016) and Halperin & Pliskin (2015) have shown, group 
emotions may produce even stronger negative reactions in those who identify with the in-group 
(IDPs), but did not experience the trauma first-hand. In Azerbaijan, this is certainly the case, as 
non-IDPs often exhibit even stronger negative emotions toward Armenians than those who lived 
in Karabakh during the era of the Soviet Union and retained memories of positive co-existence 
(Garagozov, 2016). This tendency would explain how some of the younger generations express 
more militant perspectives than their parents, an issue which will be addressed further later in this 
paper.  




Kinship & Identity 
One of the central themes running through the interviews was family relations, as the main 
way through which kinship and identity was expressed. This section corresponds with collective 
memory, as defined by Bresco de Luna’s (2017). This term “refers to the active past inextricably 
bound to the present identity of a group” (p. 281). The stories of family and kinship told by 
informants correspond with what Garagozov (2016) calls “informal history”; the transmissions of 
stories within family networks from generation to generation (p. 28). These stories both mirror and 
at times contest the formation of collective memory through official social institutions. Per Bresco 
and Wagoner (2016), dynamic memory can explain the importance of these informal histories, as 
the collective past is constantly informing how people imagine a future, and therefore what 
possibilities exist in that future.  
For the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh, the framing of memories is a critical key to unlocking 
the possibilities for future resolution. Informal histories exist, not in a vacuum, as the domain of 
individual experiences, rather as pieces of the stories which represent regions, communities, and 
families. Although the older interviewees discussed the trauma of what they witnessed during the 
war, it was particularly the younger generation, displaced as children and having spent their entire 
adult lives in limbo, that felt the most torn as they tried to plan for the future. They used language 
which was indicative of this rupture. For example, Aysel said she felt her childhood cut off forever 
when her family crossed the Araz River into Iran on the back of a lorry (personal communication, 
January 18, 2019). Ramina said she still felt like she was twelve years old inside, the age when 
they left Qubatli (personal communication, January 24, 2019). Even though the bombs were 
raining on their village, Ramina told me that her two sisters had still gone to school. They hid in 
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the dug-out under their bed in the evenings. At that time, everyone had built bomb shelters in their 
homes, but as the regions were occupied one-by-one, having to leave for good became more and 
more of a reality. For children, living in a climate of war, life was mundane as much as it was 
traumatizing. Nuray recounted how she and her sister would get bored in the bomb shelter, saying 
that they could never sleep comfortably, but still had to go to school in the morning. Then it became 
too dangerous and families started sending their children to live with relatives in other cities. 
Elshad from Qubatli told the heart-wrenching story of an attack on his village, when he was 
fourteen. Grad rockets smashed through his family’s house, killing his sister and her family while 
his father shielded him by pinning him to the floor (Elshad, personal interview, January 21, 2019). 
Traumatic experiences such as these left younger IDPs feeling responsible for a future return to 
Nagorno-Karabakh in order to make peace with their experiences, yet depressed by the reality of 
living over half their lives displaced.  
Another aspect of dynamic memory was the way informants recounted detailed images 
from their former homes. In these narratives, interviewees often claimed that they remembered 
everything about their past; every tree, every door, every household utensil they left behind. One 
of the interviewees, Ramina, said that shortly before her father passed away, years later in Baku, 
they looked at Google Maps together. They searched for their old home. “Of course, everything 
had been destroyed, but we still knew where the buildings used to stand, and the bridge. The river, 
well they [the Armenians] couldn’t change that,” (Ramina, personal communication, January 24, 
2019). The vividness of the memories that respondents recounted, many of which have been re-
told and re-remembered again and again, seem to give IDPs a type of double-life: there was life 
before the war, and life after it. These are distinct and irreconcilable experiences. This double-life 
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was expressed as the source of suffering and confusion by interviewees as they navigated their 
lives and planned for the future. Aysel, a mother of two and an academic, described her feelings:  
After leaving Zengilan… Both my mother and my father their hair became really 
white, and today I think, I am 37 years old. When my mother left she was 33 years 
old. It was really hard, that stress, I think about it. I always think about it, now that 
I have two daughters, and if I had lived the same life, would I have been able to 
overcome these struggles? It was so difficult. To flee and leave those things. For 
me, as a child it wasn’t like I was leaving them behind. Much later I left them behind, 
much later I became scared. I was a child, I didn’t understand where we were going, 
why we were going. 
(Aysel, personal interview, January 18, 2019) 
The tension between generations showed up in all of the interviews. In Azerbaijani culture, 
life revolves around family. Informants illustrated and validated their own histories by recounting 
the experience of family members, which often became the reasoning behind some of their deepest 
beliefs. These family narratives served as oral allegories for larger collective narratives about 
pride, grievance, resentment, hatred, etc. (Bresco de Luna, 2017). Resilience after the war, 
especially for those who experienced displacement as children, was seen as a product of crucial 
family support. Now as adults, the generation displaced as children is raising children of their own 
who have seen neither conflict nor suffering. But the new generation has also never seen the home 
their parents long for. The youngest IDPs perceive their own children as lacking the motivation 
that comes with having struggled—while this is a common intergenerational issue, it is magnified 
by traumatic experiences of conflict. In line with Bresco’s (2017) concept of dynamic memory, as 
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parents imagine a future for their children based upon their own past experiences, they constrain 
their children’s experiences to fit this image. This, in turn produces a type of intergenerational 
conflict. Informants discussed how they perceived a level of dissonance between their individual 
experience growing up during wartime, and how they compare their children with themselves and 
themselves with their parents.  
Another aspect of the intergenerational dynamic was a sense of shame felt by IDP parents 
who cannot provide their children the upbringing that they themselves experienced. In Baku, the 
majority of families have migrated to the city from other regions, and therefore going back to the 
village or countryside during the summer and holidays is the traditional way for families to 
maintain kinship networks, keep their pantries stocked, and unwind. The village life—good food, 
clean air and water, time in nature—is highly valued in Azerbaijan. IDP parents have deep 
concerns about the consequences of their children losing this connection to rural life as they grow 
up in the city, distracted by materialism and technology. One father from Qubatli talked about this 
struggle as a parent, illustrating salient concerns about losing physical and economic access to the 
land: 
My son asks me, ‘take us to the countryside, take us to our village, our region.’ I 
say, we have a region, only the Armenians have occupied it. Now, how do I explain 
this to this poor child! He’s not even in the first grade yet... Tomorrow, when the 
land is returned, I will be able to bring my child there. That child was born here. If 
I die tomorrow, the land is forgotten… I talk about it. I tell him how we had a view 
like this. Our garden, in our garden there was every kind of fruit. Today I do not 
have the ability to give him one of those fruits. 
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(Ali, personal interview, January 26, 2019) 
 The confusion and distress of physical displacement was crucial part of the IDP identity, 
evidenced in the way respondents articulated stories of relocation, survival, and overcoming. In 
1994, 1 in 8 people in Azerbaijan had been displaced (UNHCR, 2009). IDPs experienced the 
trauma of going from self-sufficient lifestyles in villages and small towns, to the capital in the 
midst of an economic and political crisis. This rupture had different implications for each 
generation fleeing. For children this meant a break, sometimes permanent, from their education. 
For adults, radical shifts in livelihood and means. Housing was informal, once well-off families 
lived in dormitories, schools and camps, or crowded with relatives. The new government under 
President Heydar Aliyev offered substantial support to IDPs throughout the 90s and beyond: they 
gave out food, paid for utilities and education, and organized housing and schools (Ministry of 
IDP Affairs, 2019; UNHCR, 2009). Because of this aid, while IDPs have differing opinions on 
how the state should conduct itself vis a vis the conflict, they feel an immense sense of loyalty to 
the administration. This support has had serious implications for Azerbaijani politics: as Nagorno-
Karabakh is seen to be the dominant, over-arching security issue which takes precedence in 
Azerbaijani politics, efforts to focus on other important domestic issues are frequently put aside in 
favor of hardline nationalism (Gahramanova, 2010). 
 
The Neighbors 
What can account for war between neighbors? This was one of my primary questions in 
looking at the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh. As the protracted resolution process has left 
Azerbaijan and Armenia in a neither-war-nor-peace limbo, negative narratives around inter-ethnic 
relations are exacerbated by the media and political discourse of the conflict, becoming crystallized 
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in Azerbaijani culture (Navikova, 2012). Nevertheless, one-on-one interviews with IDPs revealed 
that these collective narratives are often made up of conflicting emotions and ambiguous memories.  
While interviewees discussed their pre-war lifestyles, they were also asked to talk about 
relations with Armenians in their communities before the war. This question was particularly 
directed at older interviewees, those who were at least middle-school age during the war, as 
children were not typically cognizant of these relationships. When asked to speak about pre-war 
relations, these interviewees fondly recounted how hospitable and kind Armenians were in their 
communities, highlighting their contributions on the local level and emphasizing economic and 
intellectual exchanges. One informant from Zengilan reminisced: 
We made friends with the Armenians. We had many bee hives, and they would 
come to visit us, they also had bees. Our greatest friendship started there. They 
would bring their bees and keep them at our house…We got along wonderfully 
with them. We would go visit them, we would even go to Armenia for visits. How 
hospitable they were: we would go to them, they would come to us…When they 
had weddings we would go, they would come when we had weddings. We had such 
a great connection, there was nothing difficult at all. It was a delightful place. 
(Nergiz, personal interview, January 15, 2019) 
Although the Caucasus was host to a long history of sporadic ethnic conflict, forced population 
resettlement and state violence throughout the 20th century, these peaceful inter-ethnic 
relationships had been part of the fabric of the villages and towns in Azerbaijan and Armenia, 
promoted by the Soviet ideology of “friendships between people” (Navikova, 2012, p. 553). While 
Armenians and Azerbaijani had historical grievances simmering below the surface, these did not 
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provide a large-scale motivation until shifts in Soviet administration allowed for Armenia’s 
movement for national sovereignty to take hold in 1988 (Gahramanova, 2010). Still, as late as the 
90s, the violence was initially seen as occurring outside of the Nagorno-Karabakh region, in Baku 
and Yerevan, and fueled by the actions of players within the intelligentsia (Gahramanova, 2010; 
De Waal, 2003). In both republics, intermarriage between communities was common and accepted, 
and because of Soviet secular policies, there was little emphasis placed on religious identity 
differences.  
            Interviewees were prompted to identify when they noticed these relations were 
deteriorating in their communities. Interestingly, there was no consensus as to when this happened, 
which may have to do with the fact that informants of different age groups and in different regions 
were effected differently, but also indicates that there has been no consolidated nationalist 
narrative to mark what was happening on the ground at that time. For a resident of Agdam, it was 
the killing of two young boys who marched to Stepanakert to stand up against the Armenian 
movement for Karabakh’s unity with Armenia. For another, it was the cutting of the Topxana 
forest outside Shusha. For a young girl in Zengilan, she recalled the story of her aunt in Armenia 
receiving death threats from her neighbors and having to flee. One informant from Qubatli 
discussed how the growth of nationalist ideology in Armenia made its way into the organs of the 
Soviet intelligentsia, and how in his university this movement for national unity began to take hold 
in 1988 as weapons were being amassed in the countryside.  
Before the outbreak of the conflict, Armenia had begun deporting Azeri communities from 
inside the Armenian SSR, many of which ended up in Sumgayit, a working-class oil city outside 
of Baku with an acute housing crisis, where this hostility fully took shape (De Waal, 2006). On 
February 27, 1988, days after the unprecedented march on Stepanakert and vote to unite with the 
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Armenian SSR, Azeri mobs took to the streets and attacked Armenian households and businesses 
in Sumgayit, killing dozens of people. Martial law was instated, and the Soviet Socialist authorities 
tried to suppress the news (De Waal, 2003). But the situation began to grow tense as fights started 
to break out. Armenians were urged to leave their homes in Azerbaijan and go to Armenia. A 
professor from Qubatli explained how relations began to change: 
We lived on the border and hung out with Armenians. There were still those that 
we had close relations with. They said, your people have behaved really cruelly in 
Sumgayit, they killed women and children.  All of them showed the slides that had 
been taken there [in Sumgayit] all around the territory of Armenia. This added to 
the enemy ideology. They already had hostility toward us, but we still thought, this 
will get better, they will research the real cause of the event and things will work 
out… 
 (Novruz, personal interview, January 19, 2019) 
            Interviewees expressed a sense of disbelief in the violence which the countries were slowly 
sinking into in the late 80s and early 90s. Initially, residents of these mixed communities could not 
believe that their neighbors would perpetrate such violence, as much as they disbelieved their own 
people capable of such things. To this day, there is little to no responsibility taken for violence 
perpetrated from the Azerbaijani side (such as the pogroms in Sumgayit, Baku and Ganja), and 
these violent events are usually explained by conspiracies which deflect blame back to Armenians 
or Russians. This unwillingness to recognize the validity each other’s historical grievances plays 
a strong role in the perpetuation of the dead-lock on both sides (Navikova, 2012).  
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A Complicated Tolerance 
            It is celebrated knowledge that Azerbaijan is made up of many different tribes and ethnic 
communities: there are Lezgin, Talysh, German, Russian, Kurdish, Jewish, as well as many other 
minorities. Azerbaijanis pride themselves on religious tolerance (in Baku, there are mosques, 
Orthodox churches, and synagogues all within a half mile of each other). Tolerance and diversity 
is considered a national treasure in Azerbaijan. When interviewees were asked whether they knew 
of Armenians in Azerbaijan, the majority recalled immediately that some 30,000 Armenians still 
live peacefully within the country.7 The Armenians living in Azerbaijan were communities who 
had historically resided there. During the war, many fled or left Azerbaijan, but still many had 
integrated, married, and would not have found a home elsewhere. As the war continued, 
Armenians living in Azerbaijan changed their names and went underground to protect themselves. 
Although interviewees said these Armenians now live more openly, they do face violence and 
discrimination and have no political or social representation within the country (Minority Rights 
Group, 2018). 
This ambiguity of relations is important to highlight, as the discussion about the Armenian 
community allows informants to emphasize how tolerant Azerbaijan is in comparison to Armenia. 
Azerbaijanis generally believe that Armenia is a monoculture, that Armenians have changed all 
the names of historical (Azeri) places and that only ethnic Armenians are welcomed and all other 
ethnicities have been expulsed. Given that Azerbaijanis may not travel to Armenia, that the media 
and education about Armenia is state-sponsored and openly espouses animosity, such ideas are 
                                                          
7 The statistics on Armenians living in Azerbaijan outside of Nagorno-Karabakh are highly contested and because of 
name changes it is impossible to find an accurate census. 30,000 is the number that everyone cites, but may be a 
large exaggeration (Minority Rights, 2018). 
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easily promoted and accepted (Gahramanova, 2010; Garagozov, 2016; Navikova 2012). 
Additionally, NGO and social initiatives to bring these two communities together have been 
largely suppressed (Freedom House, 2019). The proclamation of tolerance ties into the victim 
narrative of Azerbaijani nationalism: Azeris have suffered and lost their homelands, and yet 
continue to welcome even those who treated them cruelly. There is pride in the fact that Azerbaijan 
did not force out Armenians the way that they had been forced out by Armenia. However, 
interviewee’s attitudes changed sharply when asked if it was possible to have relationships or 
communicate with Armenians. 
As discussed above, close personal relationships between Azerbaijanis and Armenians had 
been a normal part of life during the Soviet Union. Some 400,000 Armenians lived in Azerbaijan, 
a third of them in Nagorno-Karabakh (Minority Rights Group, 2018).  As the conflict progressed, 
those former relationships and communication channels became completely severed. On the 
personal level, there is no way to talk to the other group any more, despite the fact that ‘others’ are 
still living in Azerbaijan. This othering is reinforced on multiple levels. When the Azeri population 
was directly displaced through conflict, the repercussions spread throughout all society, enforcing, 
even for those who would not be inclined to equate all Armenians with the enemy, a societal 
imperative to maintain the block on communication with them. 8  Regardless of whether 
Azerbaijanis distinguish between individuals and state actions, the block on communication is 
perpetuated through the media, the education system, and through cultural norms. Thus, attempting 
to forge personal relationships is treacherous; although some Azerbaijani IDPs maintain positive 
                                                          
8 One language instructor told me she would not feel comfortable adding childhood Armenian friends on Facebook 
or visiting them in Russia although she wanted to connect with them, because it would be disrespectful or even 
treacherous to her family. 
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views about Armenian people (their workmanship and business acuity is traditionally praised), 
actually having a relationship with an Armenian, or getting in touch with former friends and 
neighbors would be a betrayal of the community and the state. The simple act of communication 
could cause individuals to lose face and potentially have serious consequences.  
Interestingly, even those who felt they could not have relationships with Armenians 
because of their personal suffering and the suffering of their kin, acknowledged that relationships 
were possible outside of the two countries. Xatira from Agdam illustrated this ambiguity, stating 
that she took part in trainings for teachers from Post-Soviet countries in Georgia and the United 
States, and worked amicably with Armenians in her field. Her perspective was that they were just 
ordinary people; they, like she, had no blame in the conflict. In contrast, another academic self-
reflectively discussed the complexity of the situation: 
I cannot say I would never speak with an Armenian. I’m not saying they’re not 
people. And it may be that these people are not responsible for the mistakes of 
politicians, it’s only that there is no trust… when the government promotes a certain 
politics, this starts to get into people’s heads. 
 (Aysel, personal interview, January 14, 2019) 
Regardless of their personal views, IDPs seem to agree that within Azerbaijan, the stakes are too 
high for there to be communication between the two groups. However, a cause for hope on the 
community level may be that interviewees frequently expressed a sense of solidarity with 
Armenian people as part of a narrative of common suffering and outrage at being manipulated by 
larger countries (e.g. Russia) and by elites during the war. “No mother should have to lose a child, 
no mother should cry” was a common expression of solidarity for those who supported the conflict 
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being resolved peacefully. Many informants expressed sympathy for Armenians, as they are aware 
of the effects of economic sanctions on Armenia (via Azerbaijan and Turkey) and despite the loss 
of Nagorno-Karabakh felt that Azerbaijan was much better off economically.9 Looking at the long 
history of shared values and co-existence between Armenians and Azeris, it should give one hope 
to realize that, in the words of conflict researcher Gahramanova (2010), “while Azerbaijanis view 
the Armenians as the enemy, the hatred is not of a racist nature. Rather, it is connected to land 
issues: ‘You are my enemy because you conquered my lands and forced me out’” (p.140). Once 
freed from the pressure of nationalism and the conflict discourse which perpetuates this animosity, 
somewhere outside their borders, individual Armenians and Azerbaijanis may have more in 
common than not.  
 
Youth & Trauma 
 Ramina started crying silently over her tea, as she described what happened at Khojaly. 
Even though she was a young girl when it happened, she told me that every winter when it snows 
she has this sensation of coldness and dread, and she thinks of those people who perished on 
February 25-26, 1992, when the Soviet Interior Troops withdrew and Armenian troops blockaded 
and attacked the town of Khojaly, firing upon and killing hundreds of civilians as they tried to flee 
                                                          
9 “May God never bring war upon anyone…Those poor children, may they never see it. May they not hear the sound 
of those bombs and missiles. I do not wish that on anyone. Including the Armenians. That is also a shame. Over 
there are also people who have directed them down a bad path. It didn’t occur to them to come and take the land of 
Azerbaijan. Someone also manipulated them. They too live in bad conditions. They live in worse conditions than 
Azerbaijanis. We live well, we have everything we need, food, work. But their situation is very bad, the economy is 
very weak there.” (Nergiz, personal interview, January 18, 2019). 
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their besieged town (Human Rights Watch, 1994). The attack on Khojaly was the largest massacre 
to occur during the war; the Azerbaijani government claimed the loss of 613 lives, although 
according to De Waal (2012), the official parliamentary number places it at 485. 10  Khojaly has 
been memorialized as the worst tragedy to befall Azerbaijan in modern times and there have been 
attempts to have the event recognized as genocide (Virtual Karabakh, 2019; Justice for Khojaly, 
2019). In many of the interviews, the event was remembered as the turning point when Azerbaijani 
families within Nagorno-Karabakh realized they would be forced to flee for their lives. A woman 
from Lachin, one of the regions very close to Armenia, described it:  
For us there, thinking about the tragedy at Khojaly, the women and the children had 
to get out immediately. So that another tragedy was not to be experienced. Crying, 
weeping, dropping everything you have, you leave home. Think about it. It was like 
that. So hard, so hard.  
(Pervane, personal interview, January 19, 2019) 
For IDPs like Ramina and Pervane who escaped from nearby regions, what happened at Khojaly 
was experienced on a visceral level and their proximity to the event was deeply traumatizing. 
Khojaly is often cited as the primary reason why forgiveness and reconciliation with Armenia can 
never be possible—it was seen as the point-of-no-return in inter-ethnic relations. The targeting of 
civilians and the human rights abuses therein were frequently enumerated by respondents in gory 
detail. The atrocities committed at Khojaly are well known, as Khojaly and other events of the war 
                                                          
10 As the village was taken into Karabakh Armenian control after the attack, an official death toll remains disputed. 
As many as 500-1,000 may have died (Human Rights Watch, 1994).  
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are key parts of school curricula. February 26 is a nation-wide day of mourning: school children 
come out to lay roses on the monuments, watch brutal documentaries in class, and draw disturbing 
and bloody pictures of the event (De Waal, 2012; Justice for Khojaly: Through Children’s Eyes, 
2019). Commemorative acts of this type, promoted by the state, and repeated year upon year serve 
to reproduce the collective imaging of the massacre in painful, unforgettable ways, obliterating 
questions of moral ambiguity (Wertsch, 2002). Some teachers who were interviewed said that the 
emphasis on these tragedies had negative effects on young children (both their own and their 
students), causing them to cry and panic in class, or become overly fixated on the brutal material.11 
However, another teacher believed that instruction about the war was extremely important, and 
that the next generation needed to know their history to be certain who their enemy was.  
The younger generations, specifically the children of IDPs, may hold stronger feelings of 
animosity and militancy than those who remember life before the war, in line with Halperin & 
Pliskin’s (2015) and Gargozov’s (2016) studies. In school, the fixation on events of the war which 
portray Azerbaijan as victim, without acknowledging the instances in which it was also perpetrator, 
have a crucial influence on the construction of ethnonationalist sentiment at a young age. Children 
grow up both removed from the conflict, and cut-off from the other community, with no 
opportunity to question the validity and historicity of these beliefs about Azerbaijan and Armenia’s 
role in Nagorno-Karabakh. The media in Azerbaijan is also strongly ethnonationalist, and 
continually features stories about Armenian aggression and Azerbaijani victimhood (Badelescu, 
                                                          
11 “Why should my daughter look and cry after all these terrible things that happened in Agdam and Khojaly. She 
watches these videos and she cries and then she goes into a depression. Sometimes I don’t let her watch them. But 
on Black January I can’t get my daughter away from the television. It’s bad! I say daughter, you’ve learned enough. 
And she says no, I want to learn more” (Aysel, personal interview, January 14, 2019). 
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2018; Navikova, 2012). With personal relationships between communities and individuals no 
longer tenable, the millennial generation has only experienced life in a frozen conflict, in a country 
where adults discuss the need and the willingness to go to war over their evening tea. What long-
term repercussions will this have on the next generation of Azerbaijanis and their visions for 
Nagorno-Karabakh? 
To be clear, the subject of the future in Azerbaijan is also complicated by larger themes. 
For young people growing up with different beliefs about success and consumerism within a 
capitalist system, the desire to sacrifice themselves for the land and their community’s honor may 
only go so deep. Often to the chagrin of their elders, the children of IDPs and refugees may identify 
less as being from Karabakh and more with where they’ve grown up, in Baku or other cities. They 
may not necessarily share the desire of their parents to go back to a place they have never lived, if 
they perceive urban life and an urban future to be preferable (more mobile and economically 
advantageous) to a rural life. This generational shift in aspirations is made possible as IDPs’ 
grievances are addressed on the ground level, through access to better housing, better schools, 
better job prospects which allow them to imagine a stable future in situ. Nevertheless, based on 
the small sample of families interviewed, it can be said that IDP parents strive to pass down their 
informal histories to their children. In sharing their collective stories of trauma, displacement, 
longing and survival, they wish to motivate their children to resolve the conflict—whether by 
going to war, or engaging in the community and finding a resolution.  
 
Conclusion: Imaginings of the Future 
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As I listened to these stories of good relations turned bad, and wondered how IDPs 
imagined a return to Karabakh would actually look like, I wanted to know if people thought 
reconciliation between Azerbaijan and Armenia could ever be possible. The professor from 
Qubatli shared his thoughts on the matter: 
These memories need time, time is needed for these wounds to heal, to forgive, to 
go back home. There are those that say, many that say, may my son go to fight for 
the land, and he goes and he is martyred and his mother and father come and kiss 
the Azerbaijani flag and say, my son died protecting the land, he died fighting for 
his honor… But those people whose sons go to fight and are martyred, they still 
say I will get my land back and then they will be next-door neighbors to Armenia, 
living again in those villages…The time will come when relations will again arise 
between these two. But that relation, in this situation, it is still difficult to forgive, 
and I understand that.  
(Novruz, personal interview, January 19, 2019) 
For relations to be remade, it will take both concrete agreements and symbolic concessions in order 
to address such long-standing grievances and cultural trauma. As evidenced by these interviews, 
it will also take time, as well as a multi-level effort to rebuild the trust and forgiveness. But good 
relations are in the interests of both Azerbaijan and Armenia, their residents, and international 
stakeholders, for economic stability and for security in the Caucasus region.  
 For IDPs, being from Nagorno-Karabakh is the source of joy and sorrow, pride and pain; 
the paradox at the center of their identities as they negotiate this state of longing. As a way to 
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conclude the interviews, interviewees were asked to reflect on what being from Karabakh meant 
to them. Some of the responses were: 
Pervane from Lachin, [laughing]: “Being from Karabakh, it’s a lovely feeling, although we cannot 
live this path anymore” (personal interview, January 19, 2019). 
Ali from Zengilan: “Every moment, every minute, our dreams are there” (personal interview, 
January 21, 2019). 
Xatira from Agdam: “To love Karabakh you have to see it. You have to live there. You have to 
drink from the water. You have to eat the bread. You have to breathe the air” (personal interview, 
January 15, 2019). 
Novruz from Qubatli: “Being from Karabakh means both happiness and the tragedy of the conflict 
with our neighbors… But regardless of this, people who have lived the torture of Karabakh, even 
those from Khojaly who went through so much cruelty, would return without hesitation…The 
feeling of Karabakh is a feeling of pride” (personal interview, January 18, 2019). 
As explored in this thesis and illustrated in the excerpts above, Nagorno-Karabakh carries 
strong symbolic and concrete meaning for Azerbaijani IDPs, as it surely as it does for Karabakh 
Armenians. As contemporary conflict studies have shown, the significance of the symbolic value 
will take precedence over material gain, especially in the case of intractable conflicts (Atran & 
Axelrod, 2008; Ginges & Atran, 2011). The power of sacred value for Nagorno-Karabakh 
stakeholders must be understood if a compromise is to be negotiated and implemented. In the 
words of Zittoun (2017), the collective past is always creating an imagining of the future. As older 
IDPs pass on the torch to their children, the ambiguity of these informal histories will change, and 
the future will also change, perhaps for the better. As it stands now, any resolution must take into 
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account the framing of identity issues within the conflict—the collective past—as it is passed down 
informally and formally to the next generation of Azerbaijanis. The key identity issues elucidated 
in this study may provide a more nuanced understanding of IDPs as one of the stakeholders in the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Their identity concerns relating to the land, their community, their 
government and Armenia will need to be taken into consideration if a resolution is to be supported. 
Ultimately, changing the vision for the future lies within the imaginings of the past. In the 
case of intractable conflict, these collective imaginings seem ubiquitous and monolithic, but as any 
form of institutionalized culture, they can also be changed and give way to alternate futures. In 
order for that to happen, the discourse on the institutional level will need to change, and mid-level 
politicians who played a critical part in fueling the conflict must now play an active role in 
deconstructing the victim-enemy narrative from the top down (Gahramanova, 2010; Gamaghelyan, 
2010). Ethnonationalist discourse in both Azerbaijan and Armenian politics, media, and education 
does not allow for a reckoning of the land as the home and the source of livelihood for both peoples. 
Attempts to resolve the conflict via this discourse have only met with failure, as ethnonationalism 
cannot recognize the rights and claims of other ethnic groups within the same territory. And yet, 
the personal stories of IDPs show the existence of alternative narratives which if anything 
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